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powerful instruments, but Levinger
offers caveats. He recommends beginning with a self-assessment to clarify
one’s own interests, and he cautions
that any analysis can only be a “snapshot.” Moreover, “in many cases, the
interpersonal relationships and the
deliberative process established during
the conflict assessment will be more
valuable than any specific conclusions.”
An illuminating chapter on “cognitive
minefields” addresses three challenges
familiar to many readers: groupthink,
“black swans,” and psychic numbing.
Regarding the latter, Levinger argues
that contrary to conventional thinking,
emotional response is integral to sound
decision making. In the words of psychologist Paul Slovic, the ideal process
is “a dance of emotion and reason.”
Levinger prescribes five steps for integrating analysis into program planning and implementation: framing the
problem, defining objectives, conducting
situational analysis, designing a program
of action, and monitoring progress.
More discussion would have been
useful here on specific ways of integrating senior leaders’ perspectives into
working-level deliberations and on helping them in turn to grasp the dynamic
complexity of volatile situations. As
Levinger notes, “conflict analysts should
not seek to become decision makers, but
rather to help decision makers become
better conflict analysts themselves.”
Levinger offers illuminating case studies,
tables, charts, and boxes highlighting key points. The comprehensive
appendixes, glossary, and list of resources add further to the value of this
book. It should be standard reading
in every security-studies program.
LAWRENCE MODISETT

Portsmouth, Rhode Island
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Harrison, Ross. Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide
for National Security, Foreign Policy, and Business
Professionals. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,
2013. 197 pp. $29.95

Ross Harrison, a professor at Georgetown University and well-known strategic theorist, takes the novel approach
that the basic tenets of strategy are applicable to nearly all human endeavors.
Rather than accepting the traditional
view that the strategic theory relevant to
a national-security professional is inapplicable to a corporate executive, Harrison introduces a multistep approach to
identifying and applying what he characterizes as universal strategic principles.
Harrison sees the aim of all strategies, regardless of the field in which
they are utilized, as being to navigate
a multidimensional external environment to the ultimate benefit of
one’s chosen endeavor. Whether you
are a military officer confronting an
asymmetric-warfare challenge or an
entrepreneur seeking to expand your
product’s market share, the underlying principles of sound strategy remain
constant. Harrison identifies three
unchanging dimensions in any strategy: systems, opponents, and groups.
The author states that systems relate to
the external environment confronting
all strategies, a “web of relationships
where a change in one part has an effect on the other parts.” A “system” can
be as defined as a formal alliance, like
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or as diffuse as the entire Middle
Eastern region and its political, economic, and cultural characteristics.
Harrison’s most subtle and nuanced
proposition is that the formulation
of strategy in the context of external
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environments is directly impacted by the
systems that shape that environment.
Harrison’s discussion of the opponent—
whether a transnational terrorist organization or a corporate competitor—as
a universal dimension of strategy builds
on his understanding of systems. While
one can seek to change the external
environment in one’s favor by strategizing against a system—for example, U.S.
efforts to promote democracy in the
Middle East as a long-term strategy to
prevent radicalization and extremism
—there is a more direct approach
available against individual opponents.
Businessmen can assess their competitors’ products and decide to invest in
specific market areas where they perceive opponents to be weak. Nationalsecurity strategists can recommend the
implementation of counterinsurgency
strategies focused on protecting local
populations because they perceive opponents to be alienating the citizenry.
Finally, Harrison discusses the impact
of groups on strategy, whether citizens organizing to protest a business’s
environmental record or mass public
opinion impacting the strategies of governments. By enunciating his concept of
groups, systems, and opponents, Harrison performs the service of providing
broad categories encompassing virtually
all the actors that confront strategists
of either a commercial or security bent.
In so doing he underlines the point
that regardless of the area of endeavor,
a strategist will face conceptual frameworks very similar to those facing
colleagues in other fields. An important addition to the study of strategy,
Strategic Thinking in 3D does much
to expand the traditional understanding of strategic theory from a narrow
subject lacking commonality between
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multiple fields of activity to a universal
framework for achieving one’s goals.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY

Washington, D.C.

Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: TwentyFirst-Century Combat as Politics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. 256pp. $32.50

Emile Simpson served in Afghanistan as
an infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha
Rifles. At first glance, the book might
appear to be an account of his experiences there; in fact, however, it is a sophisticated examination of twenty-firstcentury warfare and of the employment
of the military instrument of power.
Its front cover is embellished with the
endorsement “Deserves to be seen as
a coda to [Prussian military theorist/
philosopher Carl von] Clausewitz’s On
War.” This is no small feat, and Simpson
delivers an intellectually sophisticated
account of the changed nature of warfare, examining war through two lenses.
The first lens is the traditional use of
armed force to seek to create military
conditions within which a political
settlement can be reached. Second, he
examines armed force deployed for a
distinctly political purpose. While these
modes are by no means mutually exclusive and can be employed by the same
actor at the same time against the same
enemy, Simpson asserts that understanding the difference between these two is
essential to achieving national-security
objectives in the twenty-first century.
Simpson continually refers to two ideas
from Clausewitz. The first is polarity—
the simple idea that wars are usually
contests fought between two sides. The
second idea is that traditionally, strategic
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